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In this book, Alastair Morgan presents a clear and detailed examination of the senses 
in which a philosophy of life informs Adorno’s philosophy and the important role it 
plays in regards to it, albeit, a role not frequently commenting upon, and indeed, not 
rendered formally significant, even by Adorno himself.  In seeking to outline the 
philosophy of life informing Adorno’s work, this book does a great service to the 
scope and possibilities in the recent revival of life philosophies, as well as to how to 
interpret Adorno’s materialism in the changed context of post-quantum philosophies 
of science and complexity approaches in the human sciences.  As Morgan points out, 
Adorno’s adherence to the life concept is not in the strong tradition of 
lebensphilosophie of the sort that informed Bergson’s élan vital, where life was 
theorised as an ahistorical metaphysical postulate, characteristic of a deep inner 
animating psychic principle; neither was it seen in the way used by Klages, who 
postulated a collective unconscious prior to history; nor even in the sense of Dilthey 
Simmel, or Lukács, who theorised life philosophy as pre-reflective experience in 
some sense prior to discursive mediation, which posited life as prior to the conceptual, 
enabling direct veridical access through either intuition (Bergson), or reduction 
(phenomenology, positivism), to explaining the noumenal world. In the sense that 
Morgan sees Adorno as incorporating a life concept, it is neither metaphysical in the 
strong senses here suggested, nor does it speak to an ahistorical, invariant, life-force, 
played out, as in Oswald Spengler, or even in a different sense, as in Hegel, through a 
philosophy of history, which portrays the unfolding of living forms within history, the 
rise and fall of civilisations, or the progress of historical cultures, or forms of life. The 
sense in which Morgan detects a life philosophy in Adorno is closest to the way 
Nietzsche utilised the concept, which Herbert Schnädelbach (1984) defines as an 
ethical life philosophy, and which Morgan (p. 9) defines as “a philosophy which 
identifies a normativity in the contrast between all that is living and all that is dead.”  
In this sense, says Morgan (p. 9) “Life…becomes the grounding for all values and 
norms.”  Although Schnädelbach sees Nietzsche as pivotal in promoting this idea of 
life philosophy as a general normative concept of life and living, Morgan claims that 
Adorno differs in significant senses in his own appropriation, and it is indeed central 
to his own use of the life concept, that his critique of Nietzsche proceeds.  
 
What is noteworthy here is the nuanced and detailed treatment of life philosophy, and 
the life concept in Morgan’s treatment in relation to Adorno. The function of a 
philosophy of life for Adorno, in short, is to classify his variant of speculative 
materialism as a conception of material experience itself lived always within the 
mediated and reflexive particularities of historical time and space.  In Adorno’s sense, 
this was a materialism which within the orbit of the neo-Kantianism which dominated 
Adorno’s work, was always mediated through culture and conceptuality, and where 
the ‘fast routes’ to hard realist objectivity and veridical access to the noumenal were 
not seen by him as tenable, involving claims to truth which went beyond the bounds 
of what was legitimately warranted. Although generally within the neo-Kantian 
theatre, Adorno parted company with Kant’s own method of attaining objectivity, 
rejecting the possibilities that such objectivity of the world could be achieved through 
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the application of universally valid laws of reason.  For Adorno, this move simply 
constituted a form of domination.  Similarly, he rejected Bergson’s ‘intuitionism’, 
Husserl’s ‘phenomenological reduction’ via the concept of ‘intentionality’, or the 
‘protocol sentences’ of positivism, in their claims to know the real without mediation 
and reflexiveness. Ultimately, what grounded a limited, that is, a mediated objectivity, 
was life itself, or rather, the experience of life, which was, for Adorno, inscribed 
through suffering, torture and various myriad forms of debasement characteristic of 
what he referred to as ‘damaged life’ and yet always potentially reconciled or 
redeemed through new and different possibilities that life could be other; could be 
different; could be better; or at least - phrased negatively - where such suffering could 
be avoided and where life could be lived in an infinite variety of other ways. It is to 
this concept of ‘experience’ as a “pre-predictive mode of humans relating to the 
world” (Morgan, p. 2) that the ontological concept of life has relevance.  Hence, it 
was the impossibility of escaping conceptual mediation that characterises Adorno’s 
solution to Kant’s paradox in reinstating life experience as the indirect route by which 
the real is apprehended and understood.  As Morgan shows, such a concept of life 
enables Adorno to construct a normative theory which permits him to delineate the 
contours of a ‘damaged life,’ as exemplified by Auschwitz, and to postulate more 
fundamentally enriched modes of living, without – hopefully – presuming an 
essential, ahistorical way of life that in some sense constitutes a ‘natural way of 
living.’  In this, life does not figure as a substantive demand to live in one particular 
way, but as a more general ontological conception of the possibility of living 
differently.  A major recurring theme throughout the book is concerned with how 
Adorno can maintain such a normative conception of life as something which can be 
fulfilled, and yet avoid essentialist presumptions of life as a ‘natural entity’ or ‘state’, 
that is prior to history or society; or as linked to a productive utopia of human 
perfection, in the sense of those bad and dangerous readings of Hegel or Marx. 
 
In terms of outlining Adorno’s uses of life philosophy as the core characteristic of his 
materialism, Morgan gives a wonderfully clear and nuanced account, relating 
Adorno’s insights to Freud, Husserl, Nietzsche, Henry, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, 
Heidegger, Bergson, Deleuze and others as well. It is in the engagement with 
Nietzsche, and with Deleuze, that I find most intringuing, and possibly – even - most 
suspect. By tracing the contours of these engagements one can see, I think, the real 
depth that Morgan achieves in considering Adorno’s oeuvre, as well as some of the 
unresolved issues of his materialist philosophy.  Possibly, also, we can find one or 
two unresolved or unclearly understood issues, in relation to Morgan’s own 
understanding, especially, in relation to Deleuze’s appropriation of life philosophy 
and its relevance for the revival of complexity theories in recent years. 
 
Although, as Morgan recounts, Adorno takes his account of life from Nietzsche, for 
Adorno life refers to human life whereas for Nietzsche it refers to life itself. While 
such a difference can be seen as important, the overall similarities between Adorno 
and Nietzsche in relation to the concept of life they invoke are both striking and 
significant. For both develop a concept of life as a force which is fundamentally 
concerned to survive and proper, and which involves dominating and mastering the 
external world.  This is what, as is well noted, makes Adorno’s anthropology similar 
to Nietzsche’s, premised upon notions of power and domination.  It is the reason also 
why both eschewed naturalistic views of knowledge and opposed correspondence 
theories of truth, or understandings of truth as emerging under the burdens of rigorous 
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enquiry, for both saw knowledge as emerging in the cut and thrust of history, and as 
warped and affected in relation to interest and ideology.  Both were also neo-Kantian 
in the same way seeing the objective world as accessible through mediation and 
reflexivity.  Although Morgan sees Adorno and Nietzsche as diverging “quite 
sharply” (p. 18), it is largely related to the particular way that the life concept is 
utilised, rather than its general function or scope within their theories. For Adorno, 
like Nietzsche, life emerges in the quest for survival, defined as self-preservation, in 
the sense of the necessity of battling the objective ‘facticity’ of the world and 
rendering it to one’s purpose. But whereas Adorno represents the struggle for 
existence in terms of self-preservation, and sees such self-preservation as confined to 
humanity, for Nietzsche, the life concept “was not dependent on human self-
preservation” (p. 19).  In addition, Nietzsche argues forcefully that there is more to 
life than self-preservation, or rather, that the concept of self-preservation is 
inadequate. To illustrate this point, Morgan usefully cites Nietzsche from the Will to 
Power (p. 345) 
 
One cannot ascribe the most basic and primeval activities of protoplasm to a will 
to self-preservation, for it takes unto itself absurdly more than would be required 
to preserve it: and above all, it does not thereby ‘preserve itself’, it falls apart – 
The drive that rules here has to explain precisely this absence of desire for self-
preservation.  
 
For Nietzsche, says Morgan (p. 19) “human subjectivity is an epiphenomenon of the 
process of life which is ruled fundamentally by a will to power.”  Yet, Morgan 
misunderstands Nietzsche when he sees such life as a ground comprising “competing 
suprahuman drives and instincts.”  The better way to understand Nietzsche here is 
simply to see the application of the life concept to all of life, rather than to merely 
human life, and to see struggles for existence as not simply involving self-
preservation, but also other motives, variable depending upon context, sometimes 
involving competition over material resources; sometimes not. Nietzsche’s real point 
is that particular forms of subjectivity, and particular forms of morality, have emerged 
as the historical outcome of certain social forces of historical evolution.  If this is so, 
then the widespread view of Nietzsche as an individualist, that is, as someone who 
sees the individual as constituted by a bundle of instincts and drives, and who 
constitutes the foundational assumption of his thinking, is mistaken, and needs 
revision. In this sense, too, it is stretching things to describe Nietzsche as representing 
the subject as the epiphenomenon of struggle, or as representing life as some 
‘suprahuman’ drive over and above human life, of which human life is but the passive 
plaything. It seems to me, indeed, that Nietzsche is more materialist here than 
Adorno.  There is a sense in which Adorno, in sharply differentiating human life from 
life itself, is guilty of anthropomorphising life.  Perhaps Nietzsche, also, avoids the 
accusation sometimes identified with Adorno (of Dialectics of Enlightenment, for 
instance) that there is an original ‘inner’ nature that has been the victim of a 
fundamental repression. It is in this sense, that Adorno has been accused, as Morgan 
notes (p. 21), citing Joel Whitebrook (1995) of ‘bad utopianism.’  For, in the extract 
cited by Morgan, as Whitebrook (1995: 151) notes, “…it would follow from the 
argument that nothing short of remaining in or recapturing the original state and 
fulfilling ‘the instinct for complete, universal and undivided happiness’ could prevent 
the dialectic of enlightenment from unfolding. This is the tacit omnipotent 
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requirement that constitutes the psychoanalytically formulated bad utopianism on 
which the entire construction rests.” 
 
In Minima Moralia, also, as Morgan notes, Adorno accuses Nietzsche of confusing 
“hope for truth” alluding in part to a relativism which is often claimed, and which I 
think Morgan shares, in Nietzsche’s writing on politics and the future. Again, while 
this is a typical reading of Nietzsche within Anglo-America representations, it is 
surprising to see someone like Morgan share such a view.  The confusion of hope and 
truth represents only Nietzsche’s normative quest for a moral order that will need to 
be constructed in a future of unchartered waters.  What Nietzsche was aware of was 
that in all such moral creeds, there is a confusion of hope and truth.  Although purely 
descriptive claims might retain a distinction between hope and truth, in relation to the 
normative construction of a world without foundations, how could they possibly be 
kept a part.  For Nietzsche, the future will need to be contingently configured 
according to a constellation of precepts and concepts which I think he realised full 
well, could not be predicted or commented upon in advance.  Thus, while his account 
of the past is merely genealogical, the challenge to the Superman – possibly – is both 
metaphysical and moral.  
 
By suggesting here that Morgan misinterprets Nietzsche, and that the issues he 
identifies are possibly contentious, and therefore correctable, then possibly a more 
positive turn toward Nietzsche could be seen as assisting in correcting the problems in 
Adorno’s own account as briefly alluded to above. Perhaps, if one other potential area 
for debate is alluded to, in Morgan’s at all times very scholarly and fine-grained 
account, it might be in the way he treats Deleuze, and the contemporary interest in 
complexity theories. While his account of Deleuze as a virtual space-traveller is by 
now familiar, a tendency to compare Deleuze unfavourably with Aristoleanism, and 
the claimed implications or consequences of a turn to Deleuze, might be seen just as 
just a trifle far-fetched. The assertion of an ontological ‘relationism’, drawing on 
Spinoza, Bergson, and Nietzsche, over a substantionalism, based on Aristotle, and 
retained in a modified form in the mechanistic philosophies of the Enlightenment, is 
interpreted by Morgan as leading to a peculiar abandonment of history and society, 
and some confused thinking over substance and its significance to philosophies of 
history and change. As Morgan notes, Adorno’s reliance on the classical notion of 
substance sharply separates him from Deleuze, and also ties him to an enlightenment 
mode of thinking, which fundamentally ties his conception of life to an essentialist 
metaphysics. Substance represents, as Aristotle clearly intended, and as Galileo and 
Newton also understood, an ahistorical foundation which grounds identity and 
constitutes the basis for an individualistic reduction and grounding within all 
historical approaches characteristic of enlightenment thinking.  Morgan understands 
that there is an issue around this, for he states (p. 134) that it is “the oscillation 
between life as process, and objects as substance, that is insufficiently elaborated [in 
Adorno’s work]”.  This is ultimately, for him, what keeps Adorno within the tradition 
of speculative rather than metaphysical materialism, “for it does not enable a full 
theorisation of the non-conceptual,” and what differentiates his approach from 
Deleuze, and from complexity theories. He points out that Harman (2005) has sought 
to integrate a materialist metaphysics which considers objects as both ‘substances’ 
and ‘relations’, thus not ‘dissolving’ individuals, or objects, within a process of 
inorganic life represented a pure becoming, which is seen as the ‘error’ of Deleuze. 
The error here in my view is that in abolishing substance, Deleuze would have readily 
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conceded that he wasn’t denying the reality of objects independent of relations.  But, 
crucially, here, Deleuze would not agree with Harman’s (2005: p. 85) claim, 
supported by Morgan (p. 134), that “[a]n object is a “substance”, not because it is 
ultimate and indestructible, but simply because it can never be identified with any (or 
even all) of its relations with other entities.”  What characterizes a substance is not the 
mere existence of an object which is necessarily irreducible to its relations at any 
particular point in space and time, but the independent ontological existence of an 
object in space and time; hence, its essence (ousia), or that which really is, as 
something prior to its relations. Because Deleuze was concerned to write philosophy, 
and not history, although objects for him, like his friend Foucault, were understood to 
come into being historically, an understanding of their ontological origination and 
maintenance was through their relations. In this view, everything is historical, and 
maintains being because of its relations, or, in a somewhat more casual terminology, 
in relation to the niche that it occupies. Building on Spinoza and Nietzsche and 
Bergson, this was the key point of the theory of affects, or combinations, whereby it is 
the configurative context or constellation which is the crucial ontological dimension, 
and not the ahistorical being of an invariant substance or atom, which is ontologically 
independent of its surroundings in its fundamental essence. While actuality and 
potentiality are denied in relation to essence, neither Deleuze, Foucault nor Nietzsche 
need deny that things and objects maintain a historically constituted being which is 
constituted through emergence and is irreducible to its parts, just as it is irreversible in 
time.  This is entailed, in fact, in thermodynamical representations like those of Ilya 
Prigogine and those complexity theorists who model their work on post-quantum 
formulations of physics and chemistry.  Such a representation explains why the object 
can be unique and irreducible but also historical, and yet without essence or 
substance
i
.  While an historian, like Foucault, would understand that in practice, 
objects, or subjects, have each in their own way, their readiness, their being, their 
state and stage of development, and their potentiality, in a pure philosophical sense, 
there is no state of ‘actuality’ which constitutes part of their essence, prior to history, 
and therefore, no ‘potentiality’ which parallels that actuality. While actuality and 
potentiality must alter their meanings in relation to an historical ontology, they are no 
longer theorisable in the sense entailed by Aristotle. It is in this sense that chance and 
immanence take on a different sense, and can contribute to the enrichment of a 
materialist theory of history.  
 
Although, on specifics like this, in relation to Deleuze and complexity theories, I 
believe a different conclusion could have been arrived at, none of my quibbles detract 
from the thoroughly scholarly and impressive way Morgan argues his thesis, and 
richer understanding of Adorno we have as a result. It is a study which not only 
relates him impressively to contemporary movements in ideas, but one which outlines 
in an original and subtle way the intricacies of Adorno’s philosophy, with chapters 
covering all of the core concepts of ‘damaged life’, of ‘suffering’, of ‘exhaustion’, 
‘dialectics’, and of ‘the possibility of living today’.  This is a book that all those 
interested in Adorno, life philosophy, or materialism, should read. 
 
 
                                                 
i
 In this sense, this view contradicts Peter Hallward (2006: 162) when he claims that “there is no place 
for him [Deleuze] to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials or 
tendencies, precisely because there is no concept of actuality within Deleuze’s philosophy.”  Although 
correct about Deleuze in relation to the Aristotelian conception of ‘actuality’, it is not clear that a 
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conception is not present within his work that can be explained in relation to the historical ontology he 
develops.  As for ‘cumulative transformation’ and ‘novelty’, a quick course on Prigoginian 
thermodynamics would explain the error in this statement and the different ways that transformation 
and novelty can be theorised within complexity approaches (see Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998) 
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